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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 As states awaken to the realization that large, expensive surface transportation projects 
can no longer be undertaken given the constraints of current funding mechanisms, policy makers 
are beginning to rely more heavily on tolling as an alternate means of funding desperately 
needed infrastructure projects.  Tolling technology has evolved considerably from the traditional 
cash collection that was prevalent fifty years ago to all electronic, high speed, open road tolling 
that allows vehicles to maintain highway speeds as they traverse tolling points.  This relatively 
new technology has substantial benefits, but has inherent risks that left unaddressed could result 
in failure to collect toll revenues in a fair, efficient, effective manner. 
 
 For states moving toward tolling as a means of project funding, the ability of toll 
authorities to collect tolls accurately and efficiently is paramount.  If toll authorities 
implementing electronic tolling fail to operate to their fullest potential, states risk not being able 
to fully satisfy the debt service requirements of bond holders that provide the capital needed to 
move forward with infrastructure construction.  This endangers the ability of the state to finance 
future road and bridge projects. 
 
 As toll authorities implement all electronic tolling (AET) systems, they may look to other 
states for guidance where such technology has been successfully utilized in the past.  However, 
this is an incomplete analysis.  Different toll authorities experience unique circumstances and 
challenges that limit the ability to apply lessons learned by examining one authority to operations 
of another authority.  This paper systematically examines nine tolling authorities over a ten year 
period using statistical analysis to identify factors under management control that are 
consistently associated with successful tolling.   
 
 The findings indicate that there are two important actions that managers can take to 
contribute to the success of electronic tolling.  The first is to set the toll rate sufficiently high 
such that it is “worthwhile” for the authority to collect a toll.  Toll rates that are too low, while 
potentially attractive to motorists, reduce the efficiency of the authority in collecting revenues.  
Secondly, large toll authorities should take steps to increase the number of vehicles that pay tolls 
through electronic means and minimize those that pay through cash or video invoicing.  Small 
toll authorities should pool their operations with other authorities in order to make investments in 
electronic tolling cost effective.   
 
 While the analysis is subject to some limitations, it provides additional guidance and 
comfort to toll authority managers initiating new toll systems.  When combined with case study 
analysis, managers should be able to use this paper to inform decisions about how to structure 
their tolling systems to ensure efficiency is optimized and the likelihood of collecting revenues 
sufficient to repay financial obligations is maximized.   
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BACKGROUND 
 
 There is a growing recognition of, and a sense of urgency to address, outdated and over-
burdened bridge and roadway infrastructure in Kentucky
1
.  Projects to rehabilitate and replace 
large bridges across the Ohio River between Kentucky and adjoining states are extremely 
expensive propositions.  Kentucky’s portion of the Louisville Bridges Project described below is 
approximately $1.3 billion; roughly the amount of revenue collected by the entire state Road 
Fund in a year.  The U.S. Congress has not raised the federal gasoline tax for over two decades, 
placing the Federal Highway Trust Fund in dire fiscal condition and essentially eliminating the 
federal government as a potential source of funding for such projects
2
.  Increasingly, states are 
looking to tolls as the only feasible source of revenue capable of supporting such large 
expenditures
3
.  Of the $1.3 billion price tag mentioned for Kentucky with respect to the 
Louisville Bridges Project, $750 million was financed through the sale of bonds and loans 
secured by toll revenues to be collected. 
 The Louisville Bridges Project is the largest single public infrastructure project ever 
undertaken in Kentucky
4
.  The project is a joint effort between the Commonwealth and the state 
of Indiana to improve mobility across the Ohio River in downtown Louisville and in the eastern 
part of Jefferson County, Kentucky.  The map in Appendix A shows the major components of 
the Louisville Bridges Project. 
The Louisville Bridges Project is divided into the East End Crossing and the Downtown 
Crossing
5
.  The East End Crossing consists of a new bridge with associated approach work on 
both sides of the river approximately eight miles upstream from downtown Louisville that will 
complete the I-265 loop around the metro area.  The East End Crossing is being financed, 
constructed, overseen, and will ultimately be maintained primarily by Indiana. 
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The Downtown Crossing consists of a major rehabilitation of the existing John F. 
Kennedy Bridge on I-65, the conversion of that bridge to southbound traffic only, the 
construction of a new bridge directly adjacent to the existing Kennedy Bridge to carry north 
bound traffic, and approach work on both sides of the river including significant safety 
improvements to the Kennedy Interchange just south of the bridges at the convergence of I-64, I-
65, and I-71, known locally as Spaghetti Junction.  The Downtown Crossing is being financed, 
constructed, overseen, and will ultimately be maintained primarily by Kentucky.   
In accordance with a Bi-State Development Agreement between Kentucky and Indiana, 
tolls will be imposed on all three new and rehabilitated bridges, and those toll revenues will be 
divided evenly between the states
6
.  Indiana will use toll revenues to reimburse the Indiana 
Department of Transportation (INDOT) for appropriations used to make availability payments to 
a private partner.  Shortfalls in the Indiana revenue share could result in INDOT being forced to 
subsidize payments to the private partner, reducing the amount of appropriations available for 
other transportation projects across the state. 
Kentucky will use toll revenues to repay approximately $750 million in toll revenue 
bonds and toll-backed loans to the federal government.  Shortfalls in the Kentucky revenue share 
could result in losses to bondholders or lenders, which would lower credit ratings and in turn 
negatively impact the ability to finance future toll projects.  As such, both states have a strong 
financial incentive to ensure that tolls are collected in a fair and efficient manner. 
The states have agreed to implement an AET system to collect revenues.  In an AET 
environment, there is no option to pay cash at the tolling points.  Motorists may either establish a 
prepaid electronic toll account, or be billed after they use the bridges.  Those who choose to 
establish an electronic prepaid account are issued a transponder to affix to their windshield, 
  
Page 4 
 
which automatically charges their account the correct toll as they drive over a bridge.  Those 
who choose not to establish a prepaid account are invoiced based on a video capture of their 
license plate.  Transponder customers enjoy a lower toll rate when using the facilities. 
The operational performance improvements that AET offers relative to cash toll 
collection are the primary motivator for considering AET.  The introduction of AET significantly 
increases roadway capacity by decreasing average and peak wait times associated with toll 
payment
7
.  This makes intuitive sense given the fact that AET takes place at highway speeds, as 
opposed to forcing vehicles to stop and pay a cash toll.  The reduction in wait times results in 
significant environmental benefits by reducing air pollution.  These environmental benefits were 
significant enough that the Federal Highway Administration required the states to engage in AET 
as a condition of constructing the Louisville Bridges Project
8
.   
Despite the advantages of AET, there is a significant risk associated with not having cash 
collection.  Historically, cash based toll collection systems employed physical barriers such as 
gates to prevent motorists from using the facility until the correct toll was collected.  With the 
introduction of an AET system, it is possible for some motorists to use the facility without 
paying the appropriate toll.  This phenomenon, known in the toll industry as “leakage”, can erode 
toll collections if sufficient penalties and enforcement for non-payment are not in place. 
Further complicating toll collection on the Louisville Bridges Project is the fact that most 
drivers in the Louisville area are not familiar with paying tolls.  The last experience with tolling 
in the area ended with the removal of tolls from the George Rogers Clark Bridge on US 31, 
known locally as the Second Street Bridge, in 1946
9
.  That means that drivers in the area have 
not been familiar with paying tolls for the past fifty years, and those experiences were cash 
tolling rather than AET.  
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Given the novelty of tolling to the area, the challenges associated with AET, and the 
importance of successful toll collection to future toll projects in Kentucky, it is imperative that 
officials managing the toll system have an understanding of the factors under their control that 
can influence the success of the tolling system.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The Louisville Bridges Project is the first electronic tolling project in Kentucky, but not 
the first in the nation.  Rating agencies, state auditors, other toll authorities, the federal 
government, and non-partisan private research groups have all previously weighed in on the 
management factors associated with successful electronic tolling.   
Fitch Ratings, Moody’s Investors Service, and Standard and Poor’s are the three most 
well recognized credit rating agencies in the United States.  While each agency relies upon its 
own proprietary rules and internal credit counsel reviews in assigning final credit ratings, all 
three agencies periodically publish general rating criteria and methodology that can be useful in 
understanding what information the agencies will collect, and how they will attempt to analyze, 
understand and weigh each piece of information in making a ratings determination. 
In discussing the management factors of toll roads, Fitch considers, “the experience of 
the management team, their record of revenue and cost management, facility maintenance, 
capital renewal, and their effectiveness relative to peers.”
 10
  Moody’s “normally meets with 
senior executives to assess business strategies, policies, and philosophies, and evaluates 
management performance relative to the performance of competitors.”  Moody’s criteria further 
discusses the importance of financial controls directly under management influence, and the 
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performance of certain liquidity measurements such as number of days of cash on hand
11
.  
Standard and Poor’s assesses “management's overall ability to coordinate its activities with 
relevant planning boards and governmental bodies,” and “evaluates management in the context 
of quality of planning involved in the budget-making process for operations, maintenance, and 
capital improvements.”
 12
 
In the United States, both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have produced research outlining management strategies 
associated with successful toll implementation.  The GAO, recognizing the importance of 
overcoming public opposition, recommends building public support by overcoming the double-
taxation argument, addressing regressivity, reinventing the government enterprise to function 
more like a business, and providing leadership by actively marketing the toll facility
13
.  The CBO 
advises that users may be concerned about tolling information privacy in an AET scheme, and 
may resist paying tolls for existing infrastructure, though that resistance almost completely 
disappears when the tolls are supporting new or expanded capacity
14
.  More recently, some 
commuters, including members of the United States Senate, have expressed concerns regarding 
tolls supporting corruption and graft, highlighting the need for transparency as a management 
tool that can contribute to AET success
14
. 
The Reason Foundation did a fairly comprehensive analysis of the AET model for a 
paper comparing tolling costs to the cost of collecting motor fuel taxes
15
.  The AET section was 
based primarily on three case analyses, but the general findings were instructional for toll 
managers.  The findings indicated that acceptance by the public was a critical factor in system 
success.  Public acceptance was increased through consistent messaging about the benefits of 
signing up for an electronic transponder as opposed to relying on video invoicing.  This message 
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needed to be reinforced through a differential toll rate.  The paper also discussed the cost to 
collect tolls in the context of what toll was being charged; an indication that efficiency is directly 
related to toll rates.  This paper provides the foundation for some of the hypotheses tested later.
 
Finally, let us turn our attention to what current and future practitioners of all electronic 
tolling have to say about successful management implementation.  In 2003, the Auditor General 
of Illinois published an audit of the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority (ISTHA).  The report 
listed 23 specific recommendations, some of which focused on the management of all electronic 
tolling.  More importantly, the Auditor conducted a survey and undertook a comparative analysis 
of ISTHA performance against peer tolling across a wide range of metrics
16
.  One 
recommendation was to improve enforcement against customers that chose not to pay through 
electronic means and were delinquent in making payments after using the roadway.  This is an 
indication that ISHTA must have been struggling to address non-electronic customers.   
When researchers investigated the implementation of AET by the Bay Area 
Transportation Authority, they found that what was needed was a differential toll rate that 
rewarded AET users over cash, that transponders needed to be more readily available to 
customers for purchase in convenient locations, and that a concerted two year marketing effort 
was needed to inform the public about AET.
 17
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METHODOLOGY 
 
The majority of existing literature addressing management of electronic tolling systems 
relies on case study analysis to identify and synthesize best practices.  This can be a useful way 
to understand what has and has not worked well in other areas, and direct practitioners away 
from the pitfalls that were common among early adopters.   
One way to strengthen the lessons learned from case study review is to perform a 
quantitative, statistical analysis of readily available tolling data.  This type of analysis can 
supplement case study work, and can potentially uncover evidence of correlations between 
factors that might lead to toll system success, and the actual success itself.  When correlation is 
present, and paired with a logical explanatory framework for why the data look the way they do, 
it is often possible to make very strong causal claims.  For managers of the Louisville Bridges 
Project tolling system, it is beneficial to understand that managers in another state adopted policy 
“x” and that the state enjoys a successful tolling system.  It is much more useful to have evidence 
that amongst multiple tolling agencies, those that adopted “x” were more successful than those 
that did not, all else being equal, because they adopted “x”. 
Using publicly available data from nine toll authorities in the United States, as discussed 
in the Data Description section, I construct a fixed effects linear regression model in an attempt 
to identify what factors make an electronic toll system successful.  This model estimates the 
impacts that each control and explanatory variable has on the dependent variable, controlling for 
inherent differences between the authorities being studied. 
Figure one gives a brief definition and explanation of each variable constructed from the 
data.  Cost to collect, the dependent variable, is a broad measure of a toll authority’s efficiency in 
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collecting toll revenues.  It represents the “success” of the tolling system in the sense that toll 
authorities that are more efficient in revenue collections are more commercially viable than those 
that are less efficient.  To achieve a low value here (meaning to spend less per dollar of revenue 
to collect that dollar, or be “more efficient”), a toll authority must be collecting strong revenues 
and controlling costs.    
The controls and explanatory variables are the factors that influence cost to collect, and 
by extension the success of the tolling system.  Controls are variables beyond management’s 
influence, but which are nonetheless likely related to cost to collect.  Controls must be included 
in the regression to make any claims about the impact that explanatory variables have on the 
dependent variable.  If controls are not accounted for, the model will have little explanatory 
power and any statistically significant results will be suspect because they could be the result of 
having omitted other important considerations. 
A positive relationship is hypothesized for the number of toll system employees with 
respect to cost to collect.  Generally, technology is seen as a lower cost substitute for labor and 
therefor one would expect to find that toll authorities that are heavily reliant on people to collect 
cash, invoice customers, review license plates, and other labor-intensive tasks would, on average, 
pay more in operating costs for each dollar of toll revenue they collect.  For the same reasons, I 
expect that the percentage of transactions collected electronically would have a negative 
relationship with cost to collect.  Authorities that can successfully drive customers away from 
cash or video invoicing and towards electronic payment through transponders will likely be more 
efficient, and expend less per dollar of revenue in terms of cost to collect. 
The final explanatory variable is revenue per transaction.  This is a rough proxy for the 
average toll rate charged.  Although this is influenced by factors outside of management control 
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such as traffic mix and overall traffic level, the toll authority does have some flexibility to 
change toll rates and influence revenue per transaction.  A negative relationship is hypothesized 
because authorities that are collecting more for each transaction should be able to cover their 
operating expenses more quickly than authorities that charge less per transaction. 
In addition to explanatory variables, the model also contains four controls.  Employee 
reporter is not expected to have any impact on cost to collect, but is included as a control to 
ensure that authorities that did not report their number of employees are not significantly 
different from those that did.  This is discussed in further detail in the Data Description section. 
Commercial vehicles are typically heavy adopters of transponder technology, so as the 
percentage of commercial traffic relative to overall traffic increases we would expect to see 
declines in cost to collect.  Increases in commercial vehicle traffic as a percentage of overall 
traffic should increase the percentage of transactions that are collected electronically, which has 
already been hypothesized to have a negative relationship with cost to collect. 
FIGURE 1 
REGRESSION VARIABLES 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Variable Type Definition Hypothesized Impact on Cost To Collect 
Authority Control Numeric value for each toll authority Controls for unique authority characteristics through time 
Cost to Collect Dependent Operating costs divided by toll revenue Driven by changes in controls and explanatory variables 
Employees Explanatory Number of non-maintenance employees Increases cause cost to collect to increase (less efficient) 
Revenue per Trans Explanatory Toll revenue divided by toll transactions Increases cause cost to collect to decrease (more efficient) 
Percent Electronic Explanatory Transactions collected electronically  Increases cause cost to collect to decrease (more efficient) 
Percent Commercial Control Transactions from commercial vehicles  Increases cause cost to collect to decrease (more efficient) 
Transactions Control Total number of tolled transactions  Increases cause cost to collect to decrease (more efficient) 
Year Control Fiscal year reported by toll authority  Increases cause cost to collect to decrease (more efficient) 
Employee Reporter Control Indicates if authority reported employees  None, included as a control for incomplete data 
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FIGURE 2 
REGRESSION MODEL SETUP 
 
Yit = β1Xit + αi + uit 
 
Where
18
 
 
αi (i=1….n) is the unknown intercept for each toll authority (n entity-specific intercepts). 
Yit is the dependent variable where i = toll authority and t = time 
Xit represents one explanatory variable or control 
β1 is the coefficient for the explanatory variable or control 
uit is the error term 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
  
 
FIGURE 3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data were collected from the Certified Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) of nine public 
toll authorities in the United States over the decade from 2003 to 2012
19
.  The full list and map of 
tolling authorities is presented in Appendix B.  These reports provide a source of financial and 
operational data that is relatively consistent across toll authorities.  Certain portions of the CAFR 
VARIABLE Unit of Measurement Observation
s 
Percentage Commercial 
 
Percentage Electronic 
 
Revenue per Transaction 
 
Toll Transactions 
 
Percentage 
Percentage 
Dollars per transaction 
Millions per year 
86 
84 
86 
86 
.863 
.240 
832 
Min 
.471 
.000 
.005 
Max S.Dev 
Cost to Collect 
 
 
Cents per dollar 20.7 63.9
  Max 
12.9 85 
Employee Number 
 
 
Individual employees 59 85 2986 845 
5.30 .96 
.143 
.032 
19.1 273 
Mean 
36.3
  Max 1044
  Max 2.33
  Max .504
  Max .113
  Max 278
  Max 
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must be compiled in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and then audited 
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.  The portions of the CAFR that are not 
audited are examined by auditors and management is questioned about the way in which the 
information was gathered and reported.  This consistency and level of audit scrutiny provides 
comfort to investors and lenders that are typically the intended audience for CAFRs, but also 
makes them an excellent source of information for academic analysis. 
While CAFRs are generally consistent, there is some flexibility in generally accepted 
accounting principles that allows entities to report slightly different variations of the same 
information.  Some manual manipulation of source data was necessary to improve consistency 
amongst the tolling authorities, although even that was not sufficient to achieve complete 
consistency.  As an example, some toll authorities include both depreciation of capital assets and 
maintenance of the roadway in their reported totals for operating expenses.  While these are 
important pieces of information, they are not directly related to the cost of operating the tolling 
system.  Depreciation is a function of prior capital expansion, and roadway maintenance 
expenses are a function of the desired level of roadway preservation.  Changes in depreciation or 
roadway maintenance expense could be the result of a growing or contracting roadway system, 
or changes in the level of quality at which the roadway is being maintained.  Since these 
expenses are unrelated, or perhaps weakly related, to the cost to operate the tolling system, they 
were extracted from total operating expenses for purposes of calculating cost to collect. 
Three of the nine agencies did not report information on the number of employees.  To 
ensure that the non-reporting agencies did not differ significantly from the agencies that did 
report, I included a control variable in the regression that indicates whether or not the agency 
reported information about employees.  Those agencies that did report employees often did so in 
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an aggregated fashion that included maintenance employees.  As previously discussed, roadway 
maintenance is not directly related to the operation of the toll system itself; therefore those 
employees are best left out of the analysis.   
Two of the nine toll authorities did not report information for the entire decade.  One 
authority reported only nine years of data, and another reported only eight.  Since the number of 
missing years was small relative to the total number of observations, no corrective action was 
taken.   
Toll authorities, like all other governmental entities, report activity on the basis of a fiscal 
year.  Some toll authorities in the study had a fiscal year that coincided with the calendar year, 
some reported on a fiscal year ending June 30
th
, while others reported on a fiscal year ending 
May 31
st
.  While some authorities provided enough information before and after the decade 
being studied to make an approximate correction for this issue, not all authorities did, so the 
difference was ignored.   
  
LIMITATIONS 
 
Researchers would prefer that when their results are published that those results be 
accepted as absolute truths applicable to all other similar situations.  These aspirations are 
captured in the terms “internal validity” and “external validity”.  Unfortunately, like other 
abstract constructs, regression models are only as powerful as the assumptions upon which they 
are built and the data that is being analyzed.  When real life fails to behave in accordance with 
regression assumptions, and when the data available for analysis departs from the ideal, 
weaknesses are introduced into the analysis that limit internal and external validity.   
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Internal validity refers to a model’s ability to capture what’s happening with the 
dependent variable and offer the true and accurate explanation of why that is happening.  If there 
are other plausible explanations for what is happening, or the researcher has failed to take into 
account the interplay between the variables in the model, then internal validity comes into 
question.  Challenges to internal validity that cannot be addressed lead to the inability of the 
researcher to assert that the model correctly describes reality. 
External validity refers to the ability of a model’s predictions to be generalizable to other 
situations.  Assuming that a model is internally valid, and is accurately explaining what is 
happening with the data, that does not necessarily mean that the results will be applicable in 
other situations that differ materially from the situation being examined.  Challenges to external 
validity lead to the inability to use the results to draw conclusions about other situations.   
The model under consideration has very few challenges to internal validity.  The nature 
of panel regressions allows them to control for the unobserved characteristics of individual toll 
authorities that are consistent through time.  This means we can be relatively confident that the 
impact the model assigns to each explanatory variable is in fact due to changes in that variable, 
and not some other unobserved characteristic.  The only remaining challenge to internal validity 
would be exclusion from the model of variables that are important in determining cost to collect.   
One tradeoff to gain the internal validity of a panel regression model is that it loses some 
external validity.  We are inherently assuming that there is something unique and unobservable 
about each individual toll authority.  Controlling for that uniqueness strengthens our explanatory 
power, but places a limitation on how far the results can be applied to other agencies.  A further 
challenge to external validity is the fact that all of the data collected for the analysis come from 
older, well-established toll authorities.  These agencies are convenient for data collection 
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purposes because they report the most financial and operational data, but if they differ in any 
significant way from other toll authorities, then the results of the analysis may not be applicable 
to other agencies.   
While limitations on external validity are unfortunate, they do not necessarily negate the 
results.  Recall that the primary reason for engaging in this model was to lend statistical credence 
to some of the lessons learned more informally through case analysis.  To the extent that the 
results confirm the knowledge from case studies, there is a strong argument that external validity 
should not be a critical concern.  Also, challenges to external validity present an opportunity for 
follow-up research.  Researchers wishing to continue this line of inquiry might consider 
reanalyzing this model with data from younger toll authorities when available. 
 
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
FIGURE 4 
REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
**Significant at 90% confidence 
***Significant at 95% confidence 
VARIABLE ESTIMATED IMPACT 
Employee Number 
 
 
-.0000152 
STANDARD ERROR 
Revenue per Transaction 
 
Toll Transactions 
 
Year 
 
Percentage Commercial 
 
Percentage Electronic 
 
Employee Reporter 
 
-.3573838 
.213582 
1.017547 
.5949798 
.0389781 
.0116462 
 
Electronic X Transactions 
 
 
-.9554784 
.0001141 
.0480593 
.2113711 
1.536083 
.5576331 
.1624331 
.0066718 
 
.4109635 
SIGNIFIGANCE 
 
*** 
*** 
 
** 
** 
 
 
*** 
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 Recall that the dependent variable is cost to collect.  Note that cost to collect was 
transformed to a logarithmic scale for this analysis.  This scaling better reflects the way in which 
cost to collect is impacted by movements in the explanatory variables and controls.  However, it 
means that we are examining percentage changes in cost to collect, and not linear changes.  For 
example, if a movement in an explanatory variable causes cost to collect to increase by “five” 
that does not mean that the toll authority is spending an additional five cents to collect one dollar 
of revenue; it means that the authority’s cost to collect is expected to increase by 5%.  If we are 
considering an agency with a cost to collect of 15 cents per dollar and the model predicts a 
movement in the explanatory variable will cause cost to collect to increase by “five”, we mean 
that cost to collect will increase to (15*1.05)=15.75 cents per dollar, not 20 cents per dollar. 
The model contains three explanatory variables, and four controls.  Addressing the 
controls first, none of the control variables were significant at a 95% level of confidence, which 
is the conventional level of significance for social science work; the interpretation of the results 
changes if you assign a lower level of significance.  This means that there is insufficient 
evidence available to claim that there is any relationship between the value for the four control 
variables and the value for an authority’s cost to collect.  Whether or not an authority reports the 
number of employees, the year during the study, the total number of transactions, and the 
percentage of commercial vehicle traffic all have no impact on reducing or increasing the cost to 
collect.  Somewhat unexpectedly, the control variable for number of toll transactions is nearly 
statistically significant in the positive direction.  This will be addressed momentarily. 
Moving to the three explanatory variables, two are found to be significant.  There is no 
evidence to make any claims at a 95% level of confidence that toll authorities with fewer 
employees are any more or less efficient in terms of cost to collect than their counterparts.  There 
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is, however, sufficient evidence to claim with 95% confidence that higher toll revenues per 
transaction are associated with lower costs to collect.   
Surprisingly, the evidence indicates that there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between the percentage of transactions collected through electronic means and the 
cost to collect.  This result contradicts the hypothesized relationship, and is frustratingly 
counterintuitive.  This means that as a toll authority increases the number of its customers using 
electronic tolling, doing so actually increases the cost to collect and correspondingly decreases 
efficiency.  This odd result is a function of some of the underlying assumptions that are being 
made with linear regression.  By regressing the total number of toll transactions and the 
percentage of electronic transactions on cost to collect individually, the assumption is that each 
of those variables reacts in a linear fashion with cost to collect.  That is to say, that increasing the 
number of transactions or the percentage of electronic transactions impacts the cost to collect in a 
linear fashion, increasing or decreasing the cost to collect by the same percentage regardless of 
all else. 
To use linear regression on variables which may not always impact the dependent 
variable in a linear way, we must use an interaction term.  The last variable listed is a continuous 
interaction term between toll transactions and the percentage of transactions collected 
electronically.  The interpretation of this result is the most interesting finding.  What it says is 
that increasing the percentage of electronically collected tolls does, in fact, reduce cost to collect; 
but only for toll authorities that process roughly 500,000,000 toll transactions per year or more.  
For smaller volume toll authorities, increases in the percentage of electronically collected tolls 
increases cost to collect. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Managers of electronic toll systems must be careful to understand what influence they 
have over the efficiency of the system.  Existing literature indicates that strong financial 
oversight of a tolling system is important.  Since tolling is a customer driven business, toll 
managers must also take steps to ensure the public understands the benefits of the system and 
uses it in the most efficient way.   
 The analysis indicates that managers can be more efficient in terms of reducing cost to 
collect by setting toll rates sufficiently high, and by focusing efforts to increase electronic usage 
of the system when transaction volumes are high.  Managers of smaller tolling systems can 
increase their efficiency by increasing electronic collection only when they “team” with other 
small agencies to achieve sufficiently high volumes. 
This analysis uses efficiency of revenue collections as a proxy for toll system success.  
To the extent that toll managers may have goals that are constrained by other factors, they may 
choose a policy or set of policies that does not maximize revenue collection efficiency.  This is 
acceptable, but it is important for managers to recognize when they are doing so, and understand 
the sacrifices in efficiency that may result from the pursuit of a competing goal.  
WORKS CITED 
 
1.  Beshear, Steven.  Comments concerning the Brent Spence and Louisville Bridges.  2014 State 
of the Commonwealth Address.  Accessed online at 
http://governor.ky.gov/Speeches/20140107_SOTC.pdf 
 
2.  Cawley, Kim.  Congressional Budget Office.  Testimony on the status of the Highway Trust 
Fund before the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit of the Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure of the U.S. House of Representatives.  June 23, 2013.  Accessed online at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44434-
HighwayTrustFund_Testimony.pdf 
 
3.  Van Benshchoten, Amanda.  “Beshear on Brent Spence:  No choice but tolls”.  The 
Cincinnati Enquirer.  January 29, 2014.  Accessed online at  
http://archive.cincinnati.com/article/20140129/NEWS0103/301290056/Beshear-Brent-Spence-
No-choice-tolls 
 
4.  Slone, Sean.  “Ohio River Bridges Project:  Transportation artery, transformational impact”.  
The Lane Report.  November 5, 2013.  Accessed online at 
http://www.lanereport.com/25676/2013/11/ohio-river-bridges-project-transportation-artery-
transformational-impact/ 
 
5.  General project information is available on the project website at http://kyinbridges.com/ 
 
6.  Bi-State Development Agreement Concerning The Louisville Southern Indiana Ohio River 
Bridges Project.  Available online at http://updates.kyinbridges.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/2012-10-16-LSIORB-final-Development-Agreement.pdf 
 
7.  Al-Deek, H., Mohamed, A., and Radwan, A. (1997). ”Operational Benefits of Electronic Toll 
Collection: Case Study.” Journal of Transportation Engineering, 123(6), 467–477. 
8.  FHWA Revised Record of Decision for the Louisville-Southern Indiana Ohio River Bridges 
Project.  June 19, 2012, FHWA-KY-SEIS-12-01-F.  Accessed online at 
http://updates.kyinbridges.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/LSIORB-Revised-ROD-w-
signature-6-20-2012.pdf 
9.  The Clark Memorial Bridge (US 31).  Bridges and Tunnels.  Accessed online at 
http://bridgestunnels.com/bridges/ohio-river/clark-memorial-bridge-us-31/ 
10.  Fitch Ratings.  Global Infrastructure and Project Finance Rating Criteria for Toll Roads, 
Bridges and Tunnels.  Last updated October 16, 2013.  Accessed online with unpaid subscription 
at https://www.fitchratings.com/web/en/dynamic/fitch-home.jsp 
 
WORKS CITED 
 
11.  Moody’s Investors Service.  Rating Methodology for Government Owned Toll Roads.  Last 
updated October 3, 2012.  Accessed online with unpaid subscription at: 
https://www.moodys.com/ 
12.  Standard and Poor’s.  Criteria, Governments, U.S. Public Finance:  Public Finance Criteria:  
Toll Road and Bridge Revenue Bonds.  Last updated October 2, 2013.  Accessed online with 
unpaid subscription at http://www.standardandpoors.com/en_EU/web/guest/home 
13.  “States’ Expanding Use of Tolling Illustrates Diverse Challenges and Strategies.”  
Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-554.  June 28, 2006.  Accessed online at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-554 
13.  “Toll Roads: A Review of Recent Experience”.  Congressional Budget Office 
Memorandum.  February 1997.  Accessed online at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/40xx/doc4014/1997doc03-entire.pdf 
14.  “Protecting Commuters:  Ensuring Accountability and Oversight In Tolling”.  Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, 
and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.  United States 
Senate, 112
th
 Congress, April 18, 2012.  Accessed online at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg80594/pdf/CHRG-112shrg80594.pdf 
15.  Fleming, Daryl et al.  Dispelling the Myths: Toll and Fuel Tax Collection Costs in the 21st 
Century, Policy Study 409 (Los Angeles :Reason Foundation, November 2012).  Accessed 
online at http://reason.org/files/dispelling_toll_and_gas_tax_collection_myths.pdf 
16.  Management Audit of the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority.  State of Illinois, Office of 
the Auditor General, May 2003.  Accessed online at http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/audit-
reports/performance-special-multi/performance-audits/fy03-toll-hwy-mgmt-full.pdf 
17.  Bedolla, Sengupta, and Bollapragada, 2007.  Slow Progress of FasTrak:  Usage Analysis of 
an Electronic Toll Collection System.  Penn State University Press.  Transportation Journal, 
volume 46, no 1.  Accessed online at 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20713663?uid=3739680&uid=2129&uid=2134&uid=2&
uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21103403519671 
18.  Form of equation adapted from Torres-Reyna, Oscar.  Panel Data Analysis Fixed and 
Random Effects.  Princeton University.  Accessed online at 
http://dss.princeton.edu/training/Panel101.pdf 
 
19.  Researcher compiled data set is an aggregation of the following original data sources. 
 
Oklahoma Turnpike Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The Year Ended 
December 31, 2012.  Statistical Section, Schedule 2 "Changes in Net Position".  Page 49.   
WORKS CITED 
 
 
Oklahoma Turnpike Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The Year Ended 
December 31, 2012.  Statistical Section, Schedule 4 "Toll Transactions By Type and Turnpike".  
Page 51. 
Oklahoma Turnpike Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The Year Ended 
December 31, 2012.  Statistical Section, Schedule 5 "Toll Revenues by Principal Revenue Payers 
- Payment Method, Class and Turnpike".  Page 52. 
Oklahoma Turnpike Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The Year Ended 
December 31, 2012.  Statistical Section, Schedule 12 "Full-Time Employees".  Page 65. 
Oklahoma Turnpike Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The Year Ended 
December 31, 2012.  About the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority 
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2012 Annual Report.  "Statements of Revenues, Expenses, and 
Changes in Net Position" 
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2012 Annual Report.  "Statements of Revenues, Expenses, and 
Changes in Net Position".   
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2012 Annual Report.  Schedules 10A and 10B.  "New Jersey 
Turnpike Schedule of Toll Revenue" and "Garden State Parkway Schedule of Toll Revenue".   
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2012 Annual Report.  "Management’s Discussion and Analysis".  
Page 10.   
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2010 Annual Report.  "Drivers Embrace Electronic Toll 
Collection".  Page 15  
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2010 Annual Report.  "Statements of Revenues, Expenses, and 
Changes in Net Position"  
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2010 Annual Report.  Schedules 10A and 10B.  "New Jersey 
Turnpike Schedule of Toll Revenue" and "Garden State Parkway Schedule of Toll Revenue".   
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2009 Annual Report.  "Statement of Net Revenue"   
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2009 Annual Report.  "Statement of Net Revenue".     
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2009 Annual Report.  Schedules 4A and 4B.  "New Jersey 
Turnpike Schedule of Toll Revenue" and "Garden State Parkway Schedule of Toll Revenue".   
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2007 Annual Report.  "Statement of Net Revenue" 
WORKS CITED 
 
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2007 Annual Report.  Schedules 4A and 4B.  "New Jersey 
Turnpike Schedule of Toll Revenue" and "Garden State Parkway Schedule of Toll Revenue".   
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2006 Annual Report.  "Statement of Net Revenue"   
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2006 Annual Report.  Schedules 4A and 4B.  "New Jersey 
Turnpike Schedule of Toll Revenue" and "Garden State Parkway Schedule of Toll Revenue".   
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2005 Annual Report.  "Statement of Net Revenue"  
New Jersey Turnpike Authority 2005 Annual Report.  Schedules 4A and 4B.  "New Jersey 
Turnpike Schedule of Toll Revenue" and "Garden State Parkway Schedule of Toll Revenue".    
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Changes in Net Position".  Page 70 
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Annual Toll Transactions Passenger and 
Commercial Vehicles".  Page 80          
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Average Number of Employees by 
Function".  Page 88 
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Service Efforts and Accomplishments 
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2011.  Statistical Section.  "Service Efforts and Accomplishments".    
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2010.  Statistical Section.  "Service Efforts and Accomplishments".    
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2009.  Statistical Section.  "Service Efforts and Accomplishments".    
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2008.  Statistical Section.  "Service Efforts and Accomplishments".    
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2007.  Statistical Section.  "Service Efforts and Accomplishments".    
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2006.  Statistical Section.  "Service Efforts and Accomplishments".    
WORKS CITED 
 
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2005.  Statistical Section.  "Service Efforts and Accomplishments".    
The Illinois State Highway Toll Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The 
Year Ended December 31, 2004.  Statistical Section.  "Service Efforts and Accomplishments".    
Florida Turnpike Enterprise Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Florida's Turnpike System Revenue Last Ten Fiscal Years".  
Page 7.           
Florida Turnpike Enterprise Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Electronic Toll Collection Last Ten Fiscal Years".  Page 8.  
Florida Turnpike Enterprise Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Operating Indicators".  Page 38-39 
Florida Turnpike Enterprise Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Changes In Net Assets".  Page 3     
Florida Turnpike Enterprise Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 2009.  Statistical Section.  "Changes In Net Assets".  Page 3 
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission Comprehensive Annual Financial Report Fiscal Years 
Ended May 31, 2013 and 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Traffic Statistics"     
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission Comprehensive Annual Financial Report Fiscal Years 
Ended May 31, 2013 and 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Traffic Composition as a Percentage of 
Total Vehicles" 
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission Comprehensive Annual Financial Report Fiscal years 
Ended May 31, 2013 and 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Summary of Revenues and Expenses".  
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission Comprehensive Annual Financial Report Fiscal years 
Ended May 31, 2013 and 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Number of Employees By Functional 
Area". 
The Ohio Turnpike Commission Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The Year Ended 
December 31, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Revenues, Expenses, and Changes in Net Position Last 
Ten Fiscal Years".  
The Ohio Turnpike Commission Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The Year Ended 
December 31, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Comparative Traffic Statistics".  
The Ohio Turnpike Commission Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The Year Ended 
December 31, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Vehicles By Class". 
WORKS CITED 
 
The Ohio Turnpike Commission Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For The Year Ended 
December 31, 2012.  Page 11 
Kansas Turnpike 2012 Annual Report.  "Summary of Turnpike Traffic" 
Kansas Turnpike Authority Financial Statements With Supplementary Information, Years Ended 
December 31, 2012 and 2011 With Independent Auditors' Report.  "Statements of Revenues, 
Expenses and Changes In Net Position". 
Golden Gate Bridge, Highway And Transportation District Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report For The Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 2012 and 2011.  Statistical Section.  Table One.  
"Revenues By Source, Last Ten Years."         
Golden Gate Bridge, Highway And Transportation District Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report For The Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 2012 and 2011.  Statistical Section.  Table Two.  
"Expenses By Function, Last Ten Years."   
Golden Gate Bridge, Highway And Transportation District Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report For The Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 2012 and 2011.  Statistical Section.  Table Five.  
"Traffic/Patron Count And Toll/Fare Per Vehicle/Patron, Last Ten Years."  
Golden Gate Bridge, Highway And Transportation District Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report For The Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 2012 and 2011.  Statistical Section.  Table Six.  
"Categories of Traffic (Southbound), Last Ten Years."  
Golden Gate Bridge, Highway And Transportation District Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report For The Fiscal Years Ended June 30, 2012 and 2011.  Statistical Section.  Table Thirteen.  
"Miscellaneous Operating Statistics, Last Ten Years."  
West Virginia Parkways Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Condensed Schedules of Revenues, Expenses and Changes 
in Fund Net Assets" 
West Virginia Parkways Authority Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 2012.  Statistical Section.  "Number of Employees".  
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
LOUISVILLE BRIDGES PROJECT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
TOLL AUTHORITIES EXAMINED 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
RESEARCHER COMPILED DATASET 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
Authority Cost to Collect % Electronic Rev per Trans Employee
ss 
Report Emp Year Transactions %Commercial 
Oklahoma Turnpike 
 
.289635 .688223 
 
1.50368 498 Yes 2012 155.2840 
  
 
.086532 
Oklahoma Turnpike .299867 .686357 1.51060 507 
 
Yes 2011 150.6840 
 
.085981 
Oklahoma Turnpike .237039 
 
.662910 1.48080 510 Yes 2010 154.2880 
 
 
.084102 
Oklahoma Turnpike .260594 .646114 1.36307 512 Yes 2009 150.2180 
1818 
 
.082959 
Oklahoma Turnpike .280976 .642634 
 
1.34349 509 Yes 
 
2008 146.0100 
 
 
.093610 
Oklahoma Turnpike .254836 .628483 
 
1.39017 505 Yes 
 
2007 141.4930 
 
.096457 
Oklahoma Turnpike .240664 ..616596 
 
1.44011 495 Yes 
 
2006 135.0820 
 
.098074 
Oklahoma Turnpike .235944 .601602 1.45855 529 Yes 
 
2005 131.0850 
 
.098562 
Oklahoma Turnpike 
Oklahoma Turnpike 
New Jersey Turnpike 
 New Jersey Turnpike 
 New Jersey Turnpike 
 New Jersey Turnpike 
 
New Jersey Turnpike 
New Jersey Turnpike 
 New Jersey Turnpike 
 New Jersey Turnpike 
 New Jersey Turnpike 
 New Jersey Turnpike 
 
.207178 
.211819 
.289308 
.452408 
.438940 
.431805 
.545049 
.532344 
.500346 
.501011 
. 
. 
.593212 
 .574886 
 .772139 
 . 
 .724824 
 .714677 
 .696850 
 
 
.673129 
 .662500 
 .635000 
 . 
 . 
 
1.49336 
1.51515 
2.35406 
1.54629 
153336 
1.50267 
1.14309 
1.11197 
1.08231 
.945753 
. 
. 
518 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 0 
 0 
 0 
. 
. 
Yes 
 No 
No 
 No 
 No 
 No 
 No 
No 
 No 
 No 
 . 
. 
2004 
2003 
2012 
2011 
2010 
2009 
2008 
2007 
2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
118.3660 
 
592.0314 
 
613.6494 
 
 
620.9671 
 
633.8183 
 
 
653.2624 
 
 
670.8106 
 
681.2100 
 
752.6646 
 
. 
 . 
 
124.4800 
 
.098474 
..056117 
.056528 
.055000 
.053279 
.055969 
.056187 
.055254 
.052072 
.098843 
. 
. 
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Authority Cost to Collect % Electronic Rev per Trans Employee
ss 
Report Emp Year Transactions %Commercial 
Illinois State Highway 
 
.248311 .863000 
 
 
1.14757 1206 Yes 2012 803.7800 
  
 
.114584 
Illinois State Highway 
 
.339684 .840000 .783684 1153 Yes 
 
2011 832.8280 
 
 
.107625 
Illinois State Highway 
 
.351441 .830000 .806227 1241 Yes 
 
2010 817.0820 
800 
 
.105601 
Illinois State Highway 
 
.395504 .820000 ..763605 1331 Yes 
 
2009 775.3530 
 
.103844 
Illinois State Highway 
 
.368017 .810000 
 
.750302 1371 Yes 
 
2008 777.8820 
 
.114884 
Illinois State Highway 
 
.322454 .800000 
 
.725737 1354 Yes 
 
2007 788.2920 
 
 
.117009 
Illinois State Highway 
 
.304021 .790000 
 
.742679 1317 Yes 
 
2006 764.1250 
 
.112010 
Illinois State Highway 
 
.288451 .740000 .743731 1354 Yes 
 
2005 780.4460 
 
 
..108999 
Illinois State Highway 
 Illinois State Highway 
 
Florida Turnpike Sys 
 Florida Turnpike Sys 
 Florida Turnpike Sys 
 Florida Turnpike Sys 
 
Florida Turnpike Sys 
Florida Turnpike Sys 
 Florida Turnpike Sys 
 Florida Turnpike Sys 
 Florida Turnpike Sys 
 Florida Turnpike Sys 
 
.415432 
.394507 
.285316 
.300060 
.292651 
.322767 
.298766 
.277064 
.256024 
.279628 
. 
. 
.474000 
 . 
 .791258 
 .756103 
 .710031 
 ..682749 
 .654884 
 .618984 
 .554470 
 .524132 
 .447373 
 .360005 
 
.475720 
.470874 
.916500 
.919158 
.921409 
.936067 
.952423 
.961560 
.956874 
.948755 
.887879 
.846173 
0 
0 
2251 
2328 
2589 
2625 
2986 
2930 
2924 
2798 
2841 
2909 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
2004 
2003 
2012 
2011 
2010 
2009 
2008 
2007 
2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
801.6030 
 
664.2790 
 
 
652.8570 
 
 
639.4260 
 
 
630.8610 
 
 
667.3200 
 
 
690.4850 
 
 
661.3680 
 
617.9300 
 
 
587.0430 
 
532.3510 
 
 
823.1450 
 
.134850 
.050939 
.051727 
.049435 
.051295 
.054777 
.056873 
.064185 
.055074 
.132449 
.052226 
.048320 
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Authority Cost to Collect % Electronic Rev per Trans Employee
ss 
Report Emp Year Transactions %Commercial 
Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 
.496295 .641100 
 
4.12931 
 
1392 Yes 2012 
 
189.0870 
 
.127597 
Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 
.486505 .600600 3.91291 1382 Yes 
 
2011 189.0420 
 
.125961 
Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 
.545418 .566100 3.71961 1384 Yes 
 
2010 186.5320 
 
.122944 
Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 
.638989 .534000 3.30579 1568 Yes 
 
2009 186.2200 
 
.126635 
Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 
.622713 .524000 
 
3.15971 1494 Yes 
 
2008 189.5510 
 
.134291 
Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 
.624079 .464200 
 
3.19616 1493 Yes 
 
2007 185.4230 
 
.136531 
Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 
.616030 .419100 
 
3.16640 1485 Yes 
 
2006 185.9010 
 
.136153 
Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 
.496564 .368300 2.89324 1518 Yes 
 
2005 188.4250 
 
.133257 
Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 
Ohio Turnpike Comm 
 Ohio Turnpike Comm 
 Ohio Turnpike Comm 
 Ohio Turnpike Comm 
 
Ohio Turnpike Comm 
Ohio Turnpike Comm 
 Ohio Turnpike Comm 
 Ohio Turnpike Comm 
 Ohio Turnpike Comm 
 Ohio Turnpike Comm 
 
.580787 
. 
.296014 
.316512 
.332575 
.409899 
.402212 
.366477 
.385327 
.386036 
.348432 
.371271 
.312300 
 . 
 .462000 
 .422000 
 .372000 
 .320000 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 0 
 
2.17395 
. 
5.13888 
4.76026 
4.82008 
3.94677 
3.81061 
3.89060 
3.61009 
3.55851 
3.83674 
3.78485 
1583 
0 
973 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1338 
0 
Yes 
 No 
Yes 
No 
No 
 No 
 No 
 No 
 No 
 No 
 Yes 
No 
 
2004 
2003 
2012 
2011 
2010 
2009 
2008 
2007 
2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
. 
 
49.8040 
 
 
49.2460 
 
48.8560 
 
48.2020 
 
50.0120 
 
51.5270 
 
51.7840 
 
51.1490 
 
50.1600 
 
48.2820 
 
188.0190 
 
. 
.207530 
.208537 
.203783 
.201734 
.219467 
.221107 
.222366 
.215058 
.129811 
.195295 
.188186 
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Authority Cost to Collect % Electronic Rev per Trans Employee
ss 
Report Emp Year Transactions %Commercial 
Kansas Turnpike Auth 
 
.359514 ..495028 
 
2.48337 0 No 2012 35.2619 
 
.117074 
Kansas Turnpike Auth 
 
.355062 .485953 2.55216 0 No 2011 33.0557 
 
 
.124803 
Kansas Turnpike Auth 
 
.354757 .472027 2.53914 0 No 
 
2010 33.3130 
 
 
.120061 
Kansas Turnpike Auth 
 
.371350 .432610 2.40839 0 No 
 
2009 32.9992 
 
 
.120052 
Kansas Turnpike Auth 
 
.393740 .424618 
 
2.41623 0 No 
 
2008 32.4610 
 
 
.132081 
Kansas Turnpike Auth 
 
.329740 .407337 
 
2.35831 0 No 
 
2007 33.1575 
 
 
.134759 
Kansas Turnpike Auth 
Turnpike 
.382963 .392329 
 
2.31243 0 No 
 
2006 32.7559 
 
 
.136106 
Kansas Turnpike Auth 
Turnpike 
.380168 .380435 2.28637 0 No 
 
2005 32.2005 
 
 
.133802 
Kansas Turnpike Auth 
Turnpike Kansas Turnpike Auth 
Turnpike 
Golden Gate Bridge 
 Golden Gate Bridge 
 Golden Gate Bridge 
 Golden Gate Bridge 
 
Golden Gate Bridge 
Golden Gate Bridge 
 Golden Gate Bridge 
 Golden Gate Bridge 
 Golden Gate Bridge 
 Golden Gate Bridge 
 
.370580 
.380463 
.260675 
.277703 
.266941 
.295621 
.321743 
..300977 
.325970 
.310071 
..315660 
.319237 
.362446 
 . 
 .681877 
 .672815 
 .642913 
 .627242 
 .600875 
 .533050 
 .517277 
 .507758 
 .493158 
 .411961 
 
2.21753 
. 
5.29505 
5.28013 
5.21218 
5.09394 
4.34510 
4.30423 
4.35113 
4.34110 
4.34259 
4.08806 
0 
0 
90 
99 
101 
101 
101 
101 
87 
85 
99 
98 
No 
 No 
 Yes 
Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 
2004 
2003 
2012 
2011 
2010 
2009 
2008 
2007 
2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
. 
 
 
19.4170 
 
 
19.0840 
 
19.2950 
 
 
19.0660 
 
 
19.6580 
 
 
19.7580 
 
 
19.4770 
 
19.3990 
 
 
19.4400 
 
 
19.4290 
 
 
32.3199 
 
 
. 
.005188 
.005408 
.005235 
.005402 
.006511 
.007136 
.007085 
.007268 
.130066 
.006996 
.007103 
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Authority Cost to Collect % Electronic Rev per Trans Employee
ss 
Report Emp Year Transactions %Commercial 
West Virginia Parkway 
 
.294099 .326900 
 
2.39297 244 Yes 2012 35.0640 
 
.214322 
West Virginia Parkway 
 
.286018 .301600 2.37786 244 Yes 
 
2011 34.4680 
 
 
.212603 
West Virginia Parkway 
 
.291883 .290000 2.32372 240 Yes 
 
2010 34.3720 
 
 
.213226 
West Virginia Parkway 
 
.416228 .262500 1.58710 234 Yes 
 
2009 33.6090 
 
 
.211193 
West Virginia Parkway 
 
.403585 .263000 
 
1.64279 247 Yes 
 
2008 34.4310 
 
 
.232872 
West Virginia Parkway 
 
.381020 .252200 
 
1.65124 247 Yes 
 
2007 35.2250 
 
 
.234634 
West Virginia Parkway 
 
.360406 .239400 
3 
+ 
 
1.75823 247 Yes 
 
2006 35.1820 
 
 
.239810 
West Virginia Parkway 
 
.381248 ..208200 1.63904 252 Yes 
 
2005 35.3860 
 
 
.234782 
West Virginia Parkway 
 West Virginia Parkway 
 
.369666 
.367387 
.193800 
 .186000 
 
1.60559 
1.59103 
249 
264 
Yes 
 Yes 
 
2004 
2003 34.4160 
 
 
35.4100 
 
 
.221031 
.222141 
